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Abstract. Our input is a bipartite graph G = (A∪B,E) where each vertex in A∪B has a
preference list strictly ranking its neighbors. The vertices in A and in B are called students
and courses, respectively. Each student a seeks to be matched to cap(a) ≥ 1 courses while
each course b seeks cap(b) ≥ 1 many students to be matched to it. The Gale-Shapley
algorithm computes a pairwise-stable matching (one with no blocking edge) in G in linear
time. We consider the problem of computing a popular matching in G – a matching M
is popular if M cannot lose an election to any matching where vertices cast votes for
one matching versus another. Our main contribution is to show that a max-size popular
matching in G can be computed by the 2-level Gale-Shapley algorithm in linear time. This
is an extension of the classical Gale-Shapley algorithm and we prove its correctness via
linear programming.
1 Introduction
We study the many-to-many matching problem in bipartite graphs: formally, this is given by
a set A of vertices (these vertices will be called students) and a set B of vertices (these will
be called courses), where every vertex u has an integral capacity cap(u) ≥ 1. Every student a
seeks to be matched to cap(a) many courses and every course b seeks cap(b) many students to
be matched to it. Moreover, every student a ∈ A has a strict ranking ≻a over courses that are
acceptable to a and every course b has a strict ranking ≻b over students that are acceptable to b.
The set of mutually acceptable pairs is given by E ⊆ A×B. Thus our input is a bipartite graph
G = (A ∪B,E) and the preferences of a vertex are expressed as an ordered list of its neighbors,
e.g., u : v, v′ denotes the preference v ≻u v
′, i.e., u prefers v to v′.
Definition 1. A matching M in G = (A∪B,E) is a subset of E such that |M(u)| ≤ cap(u) for
each u ∈ A ∪B, where M(u) = {v : (u, v) ∈M}.
The goal is to compute an optimal matching in G. The usual definition of optimality here
has been pairwise-stability [28]. A matching M in G is said to be pairwise-stable if there is no
student-course pair (a, b) that “blocks” M . We say a pair (a, b) ∈ E \M blocks M if (1) either a
has less than cap(a) partners in M or a prefers b to its worst partner in M and (2) either b has
less than cap(b) partners in M or b prefers a to its worst partner in M . It is known that pairwise-
stable matchings always exist [28] and the Gale-Shapley algorithm [9] for the one-to-one variant,
or the marriage problem, can be easily generalized to find such a matching in G = (A ∪ B,E).
The many-to-one variant, also called the hospitals/residents problem, where cap(a) = 1 for every
a ∈ A, was studied by Gale and Shapley [9] who showed that their algorithm for the marriage
problem extends to the hospitals/residents problem.
Since a (pairwise) stable matching is a maximal matching in G, its size is at least |Mmax|/2,
where Mmax is a max-size matching in G. This bound can be tight as shown by the following
simple example: let A = {a, a′} and B = {b, b′} where each vertex has capacity 1 and the edge
set is E = {(a, b), (a, b′), (a′, b)}. The preferences are shown in the table below. Here the only
stable matching (red line) is S = {(a, b)}, which is of size 1. However, the max-size matching
(dashed lines) Mmax = {(a′, b), (a, b′)} is of size 2.
a : b, b′ b : a, a′
a′ : b b′ : a
a
a′
b
b′
It can be shown that all pairwise-stable matchings have to match the same set of vertices
and every vertex gets matched to the same capacity in every pairwise-stable matching. In the
hospitals/residents setting, this is popularly called the “Rural Hospitals Theorem” [10,29]. More
precisely, Roth [29] showed that not only is every hospital matched to the same number of
residents in every stable matching, but moreover, every hospital that is not matched up to its
capacity in some stable matching is actually matched to the same set of residents in any stable
matching. Thus the notion of stability is very restrictive.
From a social point of view, it seems desirable to have a high number of students registered for
courses to make effective use of available resources. Similarly, in the hospitals/residents setting,
it seems desirable to have a higher number of residents matched to hospitals in order to keep few
residents unemployed and guarantee sufficient staffing for hospitals. The latter point particularly
applies to rural hospitals that oftentimes face the problem of being understaffed with residents
by the National Resident Matching Program in the USA (cf. [27,29]). This motivates relaxing the
notion of “absence of blocking edges” to a weaker notion of stability so as to obtain matchings
that are guaranteed to be significantly larger than |Mmax|/2. Note that we do not wish to ignore
the preferences of vertices and impose a max-size matching on them as such a way of assignment
may be highly undesirable from a social viewpoint. Instead our approach is to replace the local
stability notion of “no blocking edges” with a weaker notion of global stability that achieves more
“global good” in the sense that its size is always at least γ · |Mmax| for some γ > 1/2.
1.1 Popularity
To this end, we consider the notion of popularity, which was introduced by Ga¨rdenfors [11] in
the one-to-one matching setting or the stable marriage problem: the input here consists of a
set of men and a set of women, where each person seeks to get matched to at most one person
from the opposite sex. Thus every vertex has capacity 1 here. Popularity is based on voting by
vertices on the set of feasible matchings. In the one-to-one setting, the preferences of a vertex
over its neighbors are extended to preferences over matchings by postulating that every vertex
orders matchings in the order of its partners in these matchings. This postulates that vertices
do not care which other pairs are formed. A matching is popular if it never loses a head-to-head
election against any matching where each vertex casts a vote. Thus popular matchings are (weak)
Condorcet winners [6] in the corresponding voting instance. The Condorcet paradox shows that
collective preferences can be cyclic and so there need not be a Condorcet winner; this is the source
of many impossibility results in social choice theory such as Arrow’s impossibility theorem.
However, in the context of matchings in the stable marriage problem, Ga¨rdenfors [11] showed
that every stable matching is popular. Hence the fact that stable matchings always exist here [9]
implies that popular matchings always exist. This is quite remarkable given that popular match-
ings correspond to (weak) Condorcet winners. In the one-to-one matching setting, there is a vast
literature on popular matchings [4,16,20,14,8,21,17].
Here we generalize the notion of popularity to the many-to-many matching setting. This
requires us to specify how vertices vote over different subsets of their neighbors. In particular,
one may want to allow a single vertex to cast multiple votes if its capacity is greater than 1. Our
definition of voting by a vertex between two subsets of its neighbors is the following: first remove
all vertices that are contained in both sets; then find a bijection from the first set to the second
set and compare every vertex with its image under this bijection (if the sets are not of equal
size, we add dummy vertices that are less preferred than all non-dummy vertices); the number
of wins minus the number of losses is cast as the vote of the vertex. The vote may depend on the
bijection that is chosen, however.
Our definition is based on the bijection that minimizes the vote, which results in a rather
restrictive notion of popularity. We show however that even for this notion of popularity, every
stable matching is popular. In particular, popular matchings always exist. As a consequence,
popular matchings always exist for every notion of popularity that is less restrictive than our
notion of popularity. Our goal is to find a max-size popular matching and crucially, it turns out
that the size of a max-size popular matching is independent of the bijection that is chosen for
the definition of popularity. We formalize all these notions below.
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1.2 Definitions
In the one-to-one setting, given any two matchings M0,M1 and a vertex u, we say u prefers M0
to M1 if u prefers M0(u) to M1(u), where Mi(u) is u’s partner in Mi, for i = 0, 1, and we say
“Mi(u) = null” if u is left unmatched in matching Mi – note that the null option is the least
preferred state for any vertex. Define the function voteu(v, v
′) for any vertex u and neighbors
v, v′ of u as follows: voteu(v, v
′) is 1 if u prefers v to v′, it is −1 if u prefers v′ to v, and it is 0
otherwise (i.e., if v = v′). In the one-to-one setting, ∆u(M0,M1), which is u’s vote for M0 versus
M1, is defined to be voteu(M0(u),M1(u)).
In the many-to-many setting, while comparing one matching with another, we allow a vertex
to cast more than one vote. For instance, when we compare the preference of vertex u with
cap(u) = 3 for S0 = {v1, v2, v3} versus S1 = {v4, v5, v6} (where v1 ≻u v2 ≻u · · · ≻u v6), we would
like u’s vote to capture the fact that u is better-off by 3 partners in S0 when compared to S1.
So we define u’s vote for S0 versus S1 as follows. Let S0, S1 be any two subsets of the set of u’s
neighbors where we add some occurrences of “null” to the smaller of S0, S1 to make the two sets
of the same size. We will view the sets S′0 = S0 \ S1 and S
′
1 = S1 \ S0 as arrays 〈S
′
i[1], . . . , S
′
i[k]〉
(for i = 0, 1) where k = |S0| − |S0 ∩ S1| = |S1| − |S0 ∩ S1|. The preference of vertex u for S0
versus S1, denoted by δu(S0, S1), is defined as follows:
δu(S0, S1) = min
σ∈Π[k]
k∑
i=1
voteu(S
′
0[i], S
′
1[σ(i)]), (1)
where Π [k] is the set of permutations on {1, . . . , k}. Let ∆u(M0,M1) = δu(S0, S1), where S0 =
M0(u) and S1 =M1(u). So ∆u(M0,M1) counts the number of votes by u forM0(u) versusM1(u)
when the sets S′0 = M0(u) \M1(u) and S
′
1 = M1(u) \M0(u) are being compared in the order
that is most adversarial or negative for M0. That is, this order σ ∈ Π [k] of comparison between
elements of S′0 and S
′
1 gives the least value for n
+−n−, where n+ is the number of indices i such
that S′0[i] ≻u S
′
1[σ(i)] and n
− is the number of indices i such that S′0[i] ≺u S
′
1[σ(i)]. Note that
∆u(M0,M1) +∆u(M1,M0) ≤ 0 and it can be strictly negative.
For instance, when a vertex u with cap(u) = 3 compares two subsets S0 = {v1, v3, v5} and
S1 = {v2, v4, v6} (where v1 ≻u v2 ≻u · · · ≻u v6), we have δu(S0, S1) = −1 since comparing the
following pairs results in the least value of δu(S0, S1): this pairing is (v1 with v6), (v3 with v2),
(v5 with v4). This makes δu(S0, S1) = 1 − 1 − 1 = −1. While computing δu(S1, S0), the pairing
would be (v2 with v1), (v4 with v3), (v6 with v5): then δu(S1, S0) = −1− 1− 1 = −3.
For any two matchings M0 and M1 in G, we compare them using the function ∆(M0,M1)
defined as follows.
∆(M0,M1) =
∑
u∈A∪B
∆u(M0,M1). (2)
We say M0 is at least as popular as M1 if ∆(M0,M1) ≥ 0 and M0 is more popular than M1
if ∆(M0,M1) > 0. If ∆(M0,M1) ≥ 0 then for every vertex u in A ∪B: no matter in which order
the elements of S′0 = M0(u) \M1(u) and S
′
1 = M1(u) \M0(u) are compared against each other
by u in the evaluation of ∆u(M0,M1) – when we sum up the total number of votes cast by all
vertices, the votes for M1 can never outnumber the votes for M0.
Definition 2. M0 is a popular matching in G = (A∪B,E) if ∆(M0,M1) ≥ 0 for all matchings
M1 in G.
Thus for a matching M0 to be popular, it means that M0 is at least as popular as every
matching in G, i.e., there is no matching M1 with ∆(M0,M1) < 0. If there exists a matching
M1 such that ∆(M0,M1) < 0 then this is taken as a certificate of unpopularity of M0. Note
that it is possible that both ∆(M0,M1) and ∆(M1,M0) are negative, i.e., for each vertex u
there is some order of comparison between the elements of S′0 = M0(u) \M1(u) with those in
S′1 =M1(u) \M0(u) so that when we sum up the total number of votes cast by all the vertices,
the number for M1 is more than the number for M0; similarly for each u there is another order
of comparison between the elements of S′0 with those in S
′
1 so that when we sum up the total
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number of votes cast by all the vertices, the number for M0 is more than the number for M1.
In this case neither M0 nor M1 is popular. It is not obvious whether popular matchings always
exist in G.
Our definition of popularity may seem too strict and restrictive since for each vertex u, we
choose the most negative or adversarial ordering for M0(u) \M1(u) versus M1(u) \M0(u) while
calculating ∆u(M0,M1). A more relaxed definition may be to order the sets S
′
0 =M0(u)\M1(u)
and S′1 = M1(u) \M0(u) in increasing order of preference of u and take
∑
i voteu(S
′
0[i], S
′
1[i])
as u’s vote. An even more relaxed definition may be to choose the most favorable or positive
ordering for S′0 versus S
′
1 while calculating ∆u(M0,M1). Note that as per (1) we have:
−∆u(M0,M1) = − min
σ∈Π[k]
k∑
i=1
voteu(S
′
0[i], S
′
1[σ(i)]) = max
π∈Π[k]
k∑
i=1
voteu(S
′
1[i], S
′
0[π(i)]). (3)
Definition 3. Call a matching M1 weakly popular if ∆(M0,M1) ≤ 0, i.e., −∆(M0,M1) ≥ 0,
for all matchings M0 in G.
Thus it follows from (3) that M1 is a weakly popular matching if the sum of votes for M1
is at least the sum of votes for any matching M0 when each vertex u compares M1(u) \M0(u)
versus M0(u) \M1(u) in the ordering (as given by π) that is most favorable for M1. In the one-
to-one setting, we have ∆(M0,M1) + ∆(M1,M0) = 0 for any pair of matchings M0,M1 since
∆u(M0,M1) = voteu(M0(u),M1(u)) = −voteu(M1(u),M0(u)) = −∆u(M1,M0) for each u; thus
the notions of “popularity” and “weak popularity” coincide here. In the many-to-many setting,
weak popularity is a more relaxed notion than popularity.
We choose a strong definition of popularity so that a matching that is popular according to
our notion will also be popular according to any notion “in between” between popularity and
weak popularity. However this breadth may come at a price as it could be the case that a max-size
weakly popular matching is larger than a max-size popular matching.
1.3 Our results
We will show that every pairwise-stable matching in G = (A ∪B,E) is popular, thus our (seem-
ingly strong) definition of popularity is a relaxation of pairwise-stability. We will present a sim-
ple linear time algorithm for computing a max-size popular matching M0 in G and show that
|M0| ≥
2
3 · |Mmax|.
We also show that M0 is more popular than every larger matching, i.e., ∆(M0,M1) > 0
(refer to (2)) for any matching M1 that is larger than M0. Thus M0 is also a max-size weakly
popular matching in G as no matching M1 larger than M0 can be weakly popular due to the fact
that ∆(M0,M1) > 0. Thus surprisingly, we lose nothing in terms of the size of our matching by
sticking to a strong notion of popularity.
Akin to the rural hospitals theorem, we show that all max-size popular matchings have to
match the same set of vertices and every vertex gets matched to the same capacity in every
max-size popular matching. However, even in the hospitals/residents setting, hospitals that are
not matched up to their capacity in some max-size popular matching do not need to be matched
to the same sets of residents in any max-size popular matching, which is in contrast to stable
matchings [29].
Techniques. Our algorithm is an extension of the 2-level Gale-Shapley algorithm from [20] to
find a max-size popular matching in a stable marriage instance. While the analysis of the 2-level
Gale-Shapley algorithm in [20] is based on a structural characterization of popular matchings
(from [16]) on forbidden alternating paths and alternating cycles, we use linear programming
here to show a simple and self-contained proof of correctness of our algorithm. We would like to
remark that the structural characterization from [16] and the proof of correctness from [20] can be
extended (in a rather laborious manner) to show the correctness of the generalized algorithm in
our more general setting as well, however our proof of correctness is much simpler and this yields
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a much easier proof of correctness of the algorithm in [20]. Our linear programming techniques
are based on a linear program used in [22] to find a popular fractional matching in a bipartite
graph with 1-sided preference lists.
1.4 Background and related work
The first algorithmic question studied for popular matchings was in the domain of 1-sided pref-
erence lists [1] where it is only vertices on the left, who are agents, that have preferences; the
vertices on the right are objects and they have no preferences. Popular matchings need not always
exist here, however fractional matchings that are popular always exist and can be computed in
polynomial time via linear programming [22]. Popular matchings always exist in any instance of
the stable marriage problem with strict preference lists since every stable matching is popular [11].
Efficient algorithms to find a max-size popular matching in a stable marriage instance are
known [16,20] and a subclass of max-size popular matchings called dominant matchings was
studied in [8] and it was shown that these matchings coincide with stable matchings in a larger
graph. A polynomial time algorithm was shown in [21] to find a min-cost popular half-integral
matching when there is a cost function on the edge set and it was shown in [17] that the popular
fractional matching polytope here is half-integral. When preference lists admit ties, the problem
of determining if a stable marriage instance (A ∪ B,E) admits a popular matching or not is
NP-hard [4] and the NP-hardness of this problem holds even when ties are allowed on only one
side (say, in the preference lists of vertices in A) [7].
Very recently and independent of our work, the problem of computing a max-size popular
matching in an extension of the hospitals/residents problem, i.e., in the many-to-one setting, was
considered by Nasre and Rawat [25]. The notion of “more popular than” in [25] is weaker than
ours: in order to compare matchings M0 and M1, in [25] every hospital h orders S
′
0 = M0(h) \
M1(h) and S
′
1 = M1(h) \M0(h) in increasing order of preference of h and
∑
i voteh(S
′
0[i], S
′
1[i])
is h’s vote for M0 versus M1. An efficient algorithm was shown for their problem by reducing it
to a stable matching problem in a larger graph – this closely follows the method and techniques
in [16,20,8] for the max-size popular matching problem in the one-to-one setting. Note that
popularity as per their definition is “in between” our notions of popularity and weak popularity.
The stable matching problem in a marriage instance has been extensively studied – we refer to
the books [12,23] on this topic. The problem of computing stable matchings or its variants in the
hospitals/residents setting is also well-studied [15,2,13,18,19]. The stable matching algorithm in
the hospitals/residents problem has several real-world applications – it is used to match residents
to hospitals in Canada [5] and in the USA [26]. The many-to-many stable matching problem has
also received considerable attention [28,3,30].
2 Our algorithm
A first attempt to solve the max-size popular matching problem in a many-to-many instance
G = (A∪B,E) may be to define an equivalent one-to-one instance G′ = (A′ ∪B′, E′) by making
cap(u) copies of each u ∈ A ∪B and cap(a) · cap(b) many copies of each edge (a, b); the max-size
popular matching problem in G′ can be solved using the algorithm in [20] and the obtained
matching M˜ in G′ can be mapped to a matching M in G. In the first place, one should ensure
that there are no multi-edges in M . The matching M will be popular, however it is not obvious
that M is a max-size popular matching in G as every popular matching in G need not be realized
as some popular matching in G′ (Appendix A has such an example). Thus one needs to show that
there is at least one max-size popular matching in G that can be realized as a popular matching
in G′; we do not pursue this approach here as the running time of the max-size popular matching
algorithm in G′ is O(mn) (linear in the size of G′) where |E| = m and |A|+ |B| = n.
In this section we describe a simple O(m + n) algorithm called the generalized 2-level Gale-
Shapley algorithm to compute a max-size popular matching in G = (A ∪ B,E). This algorithm
works on the graph H = (A′′ ∪B,E′′) defined as follows: A′′ consists of two copies a0 and a1 of
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every student a in A, i.e., A′′ = {a0, a1 : a ∈ A}. The set B of courses in H is the same as in G
and the edge set here is E′′ = {(a0, b), (a1, b) : (a, b) ∈ E}.
The preference list of ai (for i = 0, 1) is exactly the same as the preference list of a. The
elements in the set {ai : a ∈ A} will be called level i students, for i = 0, 1. Every b ∈ B prefers
any level 1 neighbor to any level 0 neighbor: within the set of level i neighbors (for i = 0, 1), b’s
preference order is the same as its original preference order. For instance, if a course b has only 2
neighbors a and v in G where a ≻b v, the preference order of b in G′ is: a1, v1, a0, v0. The sum
of capacities of a0 and a1 will be cap(a) and we will use residual(a) to denote the cap(a)−|M(a)|,
where M is the current matching. At any point in time, only one of a0 and a1 will be active in
our algorithm.
A description of our algorithm is given as Algorithm 1. To begin with, all level 0 students are
active in our algorithm and all level 1 students are inactive. We keep a queue Q of all the active
students and they propose as follows:
– every active student ai, where a is not fully matched, proposes to its most preferred neighbor
in H that it has not yet proposed to (lines 4-5 of Algorithm 1)
– if a0 has already proposed to all its neighbors in H and a is not fully matched, then a0
becomes inactive and a1 becomes active and it joins the queue Q (lines 20-21).
Algorithm 1 Input: H = (A′′ ∪B,E′′); Output: A matching M in H
1. Initialize Q = {a0 : a ∈ A} and M = ∅. Set residual(a) = cap(a) for all a ∈ A.
2. while Q 6= ∅ do
3. delete the first vertex from Q: call this vertex ai.
4. while ai has one or more neighbors in H to propose to and residual(a) > 0 do
5. – let b be the most preferred neighbor of ai in H that ai has not yet proposed to.
{So every neighbor of ai in the current graph H that is ranked better than b is already
matched to ai in M .}
6. – add the edge (ai, b) to M .
7. if i = 1 and b is already matched to a0 then
8. – delete the edge (a0, b) from M . {So (a0, b) in M gets replaced by (a1, b).}
9. else
10. – set residual(a) = residual(a)− 1. {since |M(a)| has increased by 1}
11. if b is matched to more than cap(b) partners in M then
12. – let vj be b’s worst partner in M . Delete the edge (vj , b) from M .
{Note that “worst” is as per preferences in H.}
13. – set residual(v) = residual(v) + 1 and if vj /∈ Q then add vj to Q.
14. end if
15. end if
16. if b is matched to cap(b) many partners in M then
17. – delete all edges (u, b) from H where u is a neighbor of b in H that is ranked
worse than b’s worst partner in M . {“Worse” is as per preferences in H.}
18. end if
19. end while
20. if residual(a) > 0 and i = 0 then
21. – add a1 to Q. {Though residual(a) > 0, the condition in the above while-loop does
not hold, i.e., a0 has no neighbors in H to propose to; hence a1 gets activated.}
22. end if
23. end while
24. Return the matching M .
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When a course b receives a proposal from ai, the vertex b accepts this offer (in line 6). In
case b is already matched to a0 and it now received a proposal from a1, the edge (a0, b) in M is
replaced by the edge (a1, b) (otherwise b would end up being matched to a with multiplicity 2
which is not allowed) – this is done in lines 7-8 of Algorithm 1.
If b is now matched to more than cap(b) partners then b rejects its worst partner vj in the
current matching and so residual(v) increases by 1 and vj joins Q if it is not already in Q (in
lines 11-13). If b is now matched to cap(b) partners then we delete all edges (u, b) from H where
u is a neighbor of b in H that is ranked worse than b’s worst partner in the current matching –
so no such resident u can propose to b later on in the algorithm (lines 16-17). Once Q becomes
empty, the algorithm terminates.
The matching M0. Let M be the matching returned by this algorithm and let M0 be the
matching in G that is obtained by projecting M to the edge set of G, i.e., (a, b) ∈ M0 if and
only if (ai, b) ∈M for some i ∈ {0, 1}. We will prove that M0 is a max-size popular matching in
Section 3.
3 The correctness of our algorithm
In this section we show a sufficient condition for a matching N in G to be popular. This is shown
via a graph called G′N : this is a bipartite graph constructed using N such that N gets mapped
to a simple matching N ′ in G′N , i.e., |N
′(v)| ≤ 1 for all vertices v in G′N .
The vertex set of G′N includes A
′ ∪ B′ where A′ = {ai : a ∈ A and 1 ≤ i ≤ cap(a)} and
B′ = {bj : b ∈ B and 1 ≤ j ≤ cap(b)}. That is, for each vertex u ∈ A ∪ B, there are cap(u)
many copies of u in G′N . For each edge (a, b) in G such that (a, b) ∈ N , we will arbitrarily choose
a distinct i ∈ {1, . . . , cap(a)} and a distinct j ∈ {1, . . . , cap(b)} and include (ai, bj) in N ′. If
u ∈ A ∪ B was not fully matched in N , i.e., it has less than cap(u) many partners in N , then
some uk’s will be left unmatched in N
′.
1. For each edge (a, b) in G such that (a, b) /∈ N , we will have edges (ai, bj) in G′N , for all
1 ≤ i ≤ cap(a) and 1 ≤ j ≤ cap(b).
2. For each edge (a, b) ∈ N , we will have the edge (ai, bj) in G′N where (ai, bj) ∈ N
′.
Thus for any edge e = (a, b) /∈ N , there are cap(a) · cap(b) many copies of e in G′: these are
(ai, bj) for all (i, j) ∈ {1, . . . , cap(a)} × {1, . . . , cap(b)}. However for any edge (a, b) ∈ N , there is
only one edge (ai, bj) in G
′
N where (ai, bj) ∈ N
′, in other words, the student ai is not adjacent
in G′N to course bj′ for j
′ 6= j and similarly, the course bj is not adjacent in G′N to student ai′
for i′ 6= i. Appendix A has an example of G′N corresponding to a matching N in a many-to-one
instance G (see Fig. 3).
There are also some new vertices called “last resort neighbors” in G′N : for any v ∈ A
′ ∪ B′,
there is one vertex ℓ(v) and every vertex v ranks ℓ(v) at the bottom of its preference list.
3. The edge set of G′N also contains the edges (v, ℓ(v)) for each v ∈ A
′ ∪B′.
The purpose of the vertex ℓ(v) is to capture the state of v ∈ A′ ∪ B′ being left unmatched
in any matching so that every matching in G gets mapped to an (A′ ∪ B′)-complete matching
in G′N , i.e., one that matches all vertices in A
′ ∪ B′. We will use these last resort neighbors to
obtain an (A′ ∪B′)-complete matching N∗ from N ′.
N∗ = N ′ ∪ {(v, ℓ(v)) : v ∈ A′ ∪B′ and v is unmatched in N ′}.
Thus if a vertex u ∈ A ∪B was not fully matched in N , then some ui’s will be matched to their
last resort neighbors in N∗. We now define edge weights in G′N .
– For any edge e = (ai, bj) ∈ A′ × B′: the weight of edge e is wtN (e) = votea(b,N∗(ai)) +
voteb(a,N
∗(bj)), where N
∗(uk) is uk’s partner in the (A
′ ∪B′)-complete matching N∗. Thus
wtN (ai, bj) is the sum of votes of a and b for each other versusN
∗(ai) andN
∗(bj), respectively.
We have wtN (e) ∈ {±2, 0} and wtN (e) = 2 if and only if e blocks N .
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– For any edge e = (v, ℓ(v)) where v ∈ A′∪B′: the weight of edge e is wtN (e) = votev(ℓ(v), N∗(v)).
Thus wtN (v, ℓ(v)) = −1 if v was matched in N ′ and wtN (v, ℓ(v)) = 0 otherwise (in which
case N∗(v) = ℓ(v)).
Observe that every edge e ∈ N∗ satisfies wtN (e) = 0. Thus the weight of the matching N∗ in
G′N is 0. Theorem 1 below states that if every (A
′ ∪B′)-complete matching in the graph G′N has
weight at most 0, then N is a popular matching in G.
3.1 A sufficient condition for popularity
Theorem 1. Let N be a matching in G such that every (A′ ∪B′)-complete matching in G′N has
weight at most 0. Then N is popular.
Proof. For any matching T in G, we will show a realization T ∗ of T in G′N such that T
∗ is
an (A′ ∪ B′)-complete matching and wtN (T ∗) = −∆(N, T ). Thus if every (A′ ∪ B′)-complete
matching in G′N has weight at most 0, then wtN (T
∗) ≤ 0, in other words, ∆(N, T ) ≥ 0. Since
∆(N, T ) ≥ 0 for all matchings T in G, the matching N will be popular.
In order to construct T ∗, corresponding to each edge (a, b) ∈ T , we will find appropriate indices
s ∈ {1, . . . , cap(a)} and t ∈ {1, . . . , cap(b)}, where (as, bt) is in G′N , such that (as, bt) ∈ T
∗; there
may also be some (uk, ℓ(uk)) edges in T
∗.
(i) For every edge (a, b) ∈ N ∩ T do: if (ai, bj) ∈ N∗ then (ai, bj) belongs to T ∗ as well.
(ii) For every (a, b) ∈ T \ N , we have to decide the indices (s, t) such that (as, bt) ∈ T ∗. In
the evaluation of ∆a(N, T ), while comparing the sets N(a) \ T (a) and T (a) \N(a) (refer to
Equation (1) in Section 1):
– let b′ be the course that a compares b with. So the matching N∗ contains the edge (ai, b
′
j)
for some (i, j) and we now need to decide the index k such that T ∗ will contain (ai, bk).
In the evaluation of ∆b(N, T ), while comparing the sets N(b) \ T (b) and T (b) \N(b):
∗ let a′ be the student that b compares a with. So the matching N∗ contains the edge
(a′i′ , bj′) for some (i
′, j′). We include the edge (ai, bj′) in T
∗.
∗ if a is compared with “null” by b (so b is not fully matched in N), then we include
(ai, bk) in T
∗ for some k such that (bk, ℓ(bk)) ∈ N∗ and bk is unmatched so far in T ∗.
– suppose b is compared with “null” by a (so a is not fully matched in N).
∗ let a′ be the student that b compares a with in the evaluation of ∆b(N, T ) and so
(a′i′ , bj′) ∈ N
∗ for some (i′, j′). We include the edge (ak, bj′) in T
∗ for some ak such
that (ak, ℓ(ak)) ∈ N∗ and ak is unmatched so far in T ∗.
∗ in case a is compared with “null” by b, then we include the edge (ak′ , bk) in T ∗ for
some k′ and k such that (ak′ , ℓ(ak′)) and (bk, ℓ(bk)) are in N
∗ and ak′ and bk are
unmatched so far in T ∗.
(iii) For any vertex uk ∈ A′ ∪B′ that is left unmatched in steps (i)-(ii), include (uk, ℓ(uk)) in T ∗.
It is easy to see that T ∗ is a valid matching in G′N and it matches all vertices in A
′ ∪B′. We
have wtN (T
∗) =
∑
e∈T∗ wtN (e).∑
e∈T∗
wtN (e) =
∑
(ai,bj)∈T∗
(
votea(T
∗(ai), N
∗(ai)) + voteb(T
∗(bj), N
∗(bj))
)
+
∑
(uk,ℓ(uk))∈T∗
voteu(ℓ(uk), N
∗(uk)) (4)
=
∑
u∈A∪B
cap(u)∑
i=1
voteu(T
∗(ui), N
∗(ui)) (5)
= −
∑
u∈A∪B
∆u(N, T ) (6)
= −∆(N, T ). (7)
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We have wtN (ai, bj) = votea(b,N
∗(ai)) + voteb(a,N
∗(bj)) from the definition of edge weights
in G′N . By grouping together for each vertex u, the edges (ui, vj) ∈ T
∗ for all partners v of u in
T and any possible (uk, ℓ(uk)) edges, we get the right side of Eqn. (5).
Crucially, Eqn. (6) follows from how we constructed the matching T ∗: for each vertex u,
we have
∑
i voteu(N
∗(ui), T
∗(ui)) = ∆u(N, T ) and so
∑
i voteu(T
∗(ui), N
∗(ui)) = −∆u(N, T ).
The total sum of all the terms ∆u(N, T ) for u ∈ A′ ∪ B′ is ∆(N, T ). Thus it follows that
wtN (T
∗) = −∆(N, T ) and hence N is a popular matching. ⊓⊔
We now apply the above theorem to show that every pairwise-stable matching in G is also a
popular matching.
Corollary 1. Every pairwise-stable matching in G is popular.
Proof. Let S be any pairwise-stable matching in G. Consider the graph G′S : since S has no
blocking edge in G, every edge e in G′S satisfies wtS(e) ≤ 0. Thus every matching in G
′
S has
weight at most 0 and so by Theorem 1, we can conclude that S is popular. ⊓⊔
Our goal is to show that M0 is a max-size popular matching in G. We will do this as follows
in Sections 3.2 and 3.3:
– We will show in Theorem 2 that M0 satisfies the sufficient condition for popularity given in
Theorem 1.
– Lemma 1 will show that no matching larger than M0 can be a popular matching in G.
3.2 The popularity of M0
We will now use Theorem 1 to prove the popularity of the matching M0 computed in Section 2.
We will construct the matchings M ′0,M
∗
0 and the graph G
′
M0
corresponding to the matching M0
as described at the beginning of Section 3. Our goal is to show that every (A′ ∪ B′)-complete
matching in G′M0 has weight at most 0. Note that the matching M
∗
0 has weight 0 in G
′
M0
.
We partition the set A′ into A′0 ∪ A
′
1 and the set B
′ into B′0 ∪ B
′
1 as follows. Initialize
A′0 = A
′
1 = B
′
0 = B
′
1 = ∅. For each edge (ai, bj) ∈M
′
0 do:
– if (a0, b) ∈M then add ai to A′0 and bj to B
′
0;
– else (i.e., (a1, b) ∈M) add ai to A
′
1 and bj to B
′
1.
Recall that M ⊆ A′′ × B is the matching in the graph H obtained at the end of the 2-level
Gale-Shapley algorithm (see Algorithm 1) and the projection of M on to A×B is M0.
A′1
A′0
B′1
B′0
Fig. 1. A′ = A′0 ∪A
′
1 and B
′ = B′0 ∪ B
′
1: all courses bj left unmatched in M
′
0 are in B
′
0 and all students
ai left unmatched in M
′
0 are in A
′
1. Note that M
′
0 ⊆ (A
′
0 ×B
′
0) ∪ (A
′
1 ×B
′
1).
The definition of the sets A′0, A
′
1, B
′
0, B
′
1 implies that M
′
0 ⊆ (A
′
0 ×B
′
0) ∪ (A
′
1 ×B
′
1). Also add
students unmatched inM ′0 to A
′
1 and courses unmatched inM
′
0 to B
′
0. Thus we have A
′ = A′0∪A
′
1
and B′ = B′0 ∪B
′
1 (see Fig. 1).
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Theorem 2 will show that the matching M0 satisfies the condition of Theorem 1, this will
prove that M0 is a popular matching in G. This proof is inspired by the proof in [21] that shows
the membership of certain half-integral matchings in the popular fractional matching polytope
of a stable marriage instance.
In order to show that every (A′ ∪ B′)-complete matching in G′M0 has weight at most 0, we
consider the max-weight (A′ ∪ B′)-complete matching problem in G′M0 as our primal LP. We
show a dual feasible solution α that makes the dual objective function 0. This means the primal
optimal value is at most 0 and this is what we set out to prove.
Theorem 2. Every (A′ ∪B′)-complete matching in G′M0 has weight at most 0.
Proof. Let our primal LP be the max-weight (A′ ∪B′)-complete matching problem in G′M0 . We
want to show that the primal optimal value is at most 0. The primal LP is the following:
max
∑
e∈G′
M0
wtM0(e) · xe
subject to
∑
e∈E′(uk)
xe = 1 for all uk ∈ A
′ ∪B′,
xe ≥ 0 for all edges e ∈ G
′
M0
,
where E′(uk) is the set of edges incident on uk in G
′
M0
.
The dual LP is the following: we associate a variable αuk to each vertex uk ∈ A
′ ∪B′.
min
∑
uk∈A′∪B′
αuk
subject to αai + αbj ≥ wtM0(ai, bj) for all edges (ai, bj) ∈ G
′
M0
, (8)
αuk ≥ wtM0(uk, ℓ(uk)) for all uk ∈ A
′ ∪B′. (9)
Consider the following assignment of α-values for all uk ∈ A′ ∪ B′: set αuk = 0 for all uk
unmatched in M ′0 (each such vertex is in A
′
1 ∪B
′
0) and for the matched vertices uk in M
′
0, we set
α-values as follows: αuk = 1 if uk ∈ A
′
0 ∪B
′
1 and αuk = −1 if uk ∈ A
′
1 ∪B
′
0.
Observe that Inequality (9) holds for all vertices uk ∈ A′ ∪ B′. This is because αuk = 0 =
wtM0(uk, ℓ(uk)) for all uk unmatched in M
′
0; similarly, for all uk matched in M
′
0 we have αuk ≥
−1 = wtM0(uk, ℓ(uk)). In order to show Inequality (8), we will use Claim 1 stated below.
Claim 1 Let e = (ai, bj) be any edge in G
′
M0
.
(i) If e ∈ A′1 ×B
′
0, then wtM0(e) = −2.
(ii) If e ∈ (A′0 ×B
′
0) ∪ (A
′
1 ×B
′
1), then wtM0(e) ≤ 0.
– Claim 1 (i) says that for every edge (ai, bj) ∈ A
′
1 × B
′
0 in G
′
M0
, we have wtM0(ai, bj) = −2.
Since αuk ≥ −1 for all uk ∈ A
′
1 ∪B
′
0, Inequality (8) holds for all edges of G
′
M0
in A′1 ×B
′
0.
– Claim 1 (ii) says that for every edge (ai, bj) in (A
′
0×B
′
0)∪(A
′
1×B
′
1), we have wtM0(ai, bj) ≤ 0.
Since αai + αbj ≥ 0 for all (ai, bj) ∈ A
′
t ×B
′
t (for t = 0, 1), Inequality (8) holds for all edges
of G′M0 in (A
′
0 ×B
′
0) ∪ (A
′
1 ×B
′
1).
Since wtM0(e) ≤ 2 for all edges e in G
′
M0
and we set αuk = 1 for all vertices uk ∈ A
′
0 ∪ B
′
1,
Inequality (8) is satisfied for all edges of G′M0 in A
′
0×B
′
1. Thus Inequality (8) holds for all edges
(ai, bj) in G
′
M0
and so these α-values are dual feasible.
For every edge (ai, bj) ∈ M ′0, we have αai + αbj = 0 and αuk = 0 for vertices uk unmatched
in M ′0. Hence it follows that
∑
uk∈A′∪B′
αuk = 0. So by weak duality, the optimal value of the
primal LP is at most 0. In other words, every matching in G′M0 that matches all vertices in A
′∪B′
has weight at most 0. ⊓⊔
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Proof of Claim 1. Consider any edge (ai, bj) ∈ A′1 × B
′
0 in G
′
M0
. Note that the matching M0
does not contain the edge (a, b) – if it did, then G′M0 would have only one copy of this edge, say
(as, bt), which being an edge of M
′
0, has to be in either A
′
0×B
′
0 or A
′
1×B
′
1 whereas we are given
that (ai, bj) ∈ A′1×B
′
0. The student ai ∈ A
′
1, i.e., a
1 got activated in our algorithm and recall that
every course prefers level 1 neighbors to level 0 neighbors in our algorithm. So if a1 had proposed
to b, then this offer would have been accepted since b had at least one partner who was a level 0
student (since bj ∈ B′0). Thus a
1 (with its entire residual capacity) must have been accepted by
neighbors that a prefers to b. Hence ai prefers its partner in M
∗
0 to b, so votea(b,M
∗
0 (ai)) = −1.
Since (a, b) /∈ M0 while a1 got activated in our algorithm, along with the fact that bj ∈ B′0,
it follows that the student a0 was rejected by b. When b rejected a0, the course b was matched
to cap(b) neighbors, each of which was preferred by b to a0. Thereafter, b may have received
(and accepted) better offers from its neighbors and since bj ∈ B′0, the course b never received
enough offers from level 1 neighbors to have all its partners as level 1 students. In particular, bj
is matched to a level 0 neighbor that is preferred to a0. Thus bj prefers its neighbor in M
∗
0 to a,
so voteb(a,M
∗
0 (bj)) = −1. So it follows that wtM0(ai, bj) = −2.
We will now show part (ii) of this lemma. In our algorithm, the preference order of each
vertex, when restricted to level 0 neighbors, is its original preference order and similarly, its
preference order when restricted to level 1 neighbors, is its original preference order. Thus for
each edge (ai, bj) in G
′
M0
where (ai, bj) ∈ (A′0 × B
′
0) ∪ (A
′
1 ×B
′
1), either (1) the vertex b prefers
M ′0(bj) to a or the vertex a prefers M
′
0(ai) to b or (2) (ai, bj) ∈ M
′
0. In both cases, we have
wtM0(ai, bj) ≤ 0. ⊓⊔
3.3 Maximality of the popular matching M0
We need to show thatM0 is a max-size popular matching in G and we now show that this follows
quite easily from the proof of Theorem 2. Let T be any matching in G. We can obtain a realization
T ∗ of the matching T in G′M0 that is absolutely analogous to how it was done in the proof of
Theorem 1. Thus T ∗ is an (A′ ∪B′)-complete matching in G′M0 and wtM0(T
∗) = −∆(M0, T ).
We know from Theorem 2 that wtM0(T
∗) ≤ 0. Suppose T is a popular matching in G. Then
wtM0(T
∗) has to be 0, otherwise the popularity of T is contradicted since wtM0(T
∗) < 0 implies
that ∆(M0, T ) > 0 (because wtM0(T
∗) = −∆(M0, T )).
So if T is a popular matching in G, then T ∗ is an optimal solution to the maximum weight
(A′ ∪ B′)-complete matching problem in G′M0 . Recall that this is the primal LP in the proof of
Theorem 2. We will use the dual feasible solution α that we constructed in the proof of Theorem 2
and apply complementary slackness to show that if (uk, ℓ(uk)) ∈M∗0 , i.e., if uk is left unmatched
in M ′0, then T
∗ also has to contain the edge (uk, ℓ(uk)). This will imply that |T | ≤ |M0|, i.e.,
every popular matching in G has size at most |M0|.
Lemma 1. Let T be a popular matching in G and let T ∗ be the realization of T in G′M0 . Then
for any vertex uk ∈ A′ ∪B′ we have: (uk, ℓ(uk)) ∈M∗0 implies (uk, ℓ(uk)) ∈ T
∗.
Proof. Consider the α-values assigned to vertices in A′∪B′ in the proof of Theorem 2. This is an
optimal dual solution since its value is 0 which is the value of the optimal primal solution. Thus
complementary slackness conditions have to hold for each edge in the optimal solution (T ∗e )e∈G′M0
to the primal LP. That is, for each edge (uk, vt) ∈ G′M0 , we have:
either αuk + αvt = wtM0(uk, vt) or T
∗
(uk,vt)
= 0. (10)
Let uk ∈ A
′ ∪B′ be a vertex such that (uk, ℓ(uk)) ∈M
∗
0 , so αuk = 0. If u ∈ A, then uk ∈ A
′
1.
Observe that all of uk’s neighbors in G
′
M0
are in B′1 – this is because for any neighbor vt 6= ℓ(uk) of
uk, we have voteu(v, ℓ(uk)) = 1 and so wtM0(uk, vt) ≥ 0. Claim 1 (i) says that wtM0(uk, vt) = −2
for all edges (uk, vt) ∈ A′1×B
′
0. Thus uk has no neighbor in B
′
0. Similarly, if u ∈ B, then uk ∈ B
′
0
and all its neighbors in G′M0 are in A
′
0; otherwise uk has a neighbor vt in A
′
1 and Claim 1 (i)
would get contradicted since wtM0(uk, vt) ≥ 0.
In both cases, every edge (uk, vt) ∈ A′ × B′ that is incident on uk in G′M0 is slack because
(uk, vt) ∈ (A′0×B
′
0)∪ (A
′
1×B
′
1): thus αuk = 0 and αvt = 1 while wtM0(uk, vt) = voteu(v, ℓ(uk))+
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votev(u,M
′
0(vt)) = 1− 1 = 0. Thus it follows from Equation (10) that T
∗
(uk,vt)
= 0 for vt 6= ℓ(uk).
Since T ∗ is (A′ ∪B′)-complete, we have (uk, ℓ(uk)) ∈ T ∗. ⊓⊔
Now it is immediate to see that M0 is a max-size popular matching in G. Let T be any
popular matching in G. Consider the matching T ′ = T ∗ \ {(uk, ℓ(uk)) : uk ∈ A′ ∪B′}. Lemma 1
implies that |T ′| ≤ |M ′0| because every vertex uk left unmatched in M
′
0 has to be left unmatched
in T ′ also. Since |T | = |T ′| and |M ′0| = |M0|, we have |T | ≤ |M0|. As this holds for any popular
matching T in G, we can conclude that M0 is a max-size popular matching in G.
It is easy to see that our algorithm runs in linear time (see Appendix B for the details). Hence
we can conclude the following theorem.
Theorem 3. A max-size popular matching in a many-to-many instance G = (A ∪B,E) can be
computed in linear time.
A max-size weakly popular matching. We will now show that no matching larger than M0
can be weakly popular (see Definition 3) as ∆(M0, T ) > 0 for any such matching T . This implies
that M0 is also a max-size weakly popular matching in G.
Lemma 2. Let T be a matching such that |T | > |M0|. Then ∆(M0, T ) > 0, i.e., M0 is more
popular than T .
Proof. Let T be a larger matching than M0. So some vertices left unmatched in M0 have to be
matched in T . Thus for some uk ∈ A′ ∪B′ such that (uk, ℓ(uk)) ∈M∗0 , the matching T
∗ (which
is the (A′ ∪ B′)-complete matching in G′M0 corresponding to T ) has to contain an edge (uk, vt)
where vt 6= ℓ(uk). Thus T ∗ contains a slack edge (uk, vt) ∈ A′ × B′ since αuk = 0, αvt = 1 while
wtM0(uk, vt) = 0 (see the proof of Lemma 1).
It now follows from Equation (10) that T ∗ cannot be an optimal solution to the maximum
weight (A′ ∪ B′)-complete matching problem in G′M0 . Thus wtM0(T
∗) < 0, in other words,
∆(M0, T ) > 0 since wtM0(T
∗) = −∆(M0, T ). ⊓⊔
Interestingly, Lemma 2 implies that for any definition of popularity that is “in between”
popularity and weak popularity, the size of a max-size popular matching is the same. To formalize
the meaning of “in between”, consider the two relations on matchings %p and %wp , whereM0 %p
M1 if ∆(M0,M1) ≥ 0 and M0 %wp M1 if ∆(M1,M0) ≤ 0, induced by popularity and weak
popularity, respectively. Clearly, %p ⊆ %wp . Note that popular matchings and weakly popular
matchings correspond to maximal elements of %p and %wp , respectively.
3 We showed that M0,
which is a max-size maximal element of %p , is also a max-size maximal element of %wp . This
implies that if % is a relation on matchings (induced by an alternative notion of popularity)
such that %p ⊆ % ⊆ %wp , then M0 is also a max-size maximal element of %. This allows us
to conclude the following proposition which even allows for different vertices to compare sets of
neighbors in different ways.
Proposition 1. The size of a max-size popular matching in G = (A ∪B,E) is invariant to the
way vertices compare sets of neighbors as long as it is in between the most adversarial and the
most favorable comparison.
3.4 The rural hospitals theorem for max-size popular matchings
The rural hospitals theorem for stable matchings [29] does not necessarily hold for max-size
popular matchings. That is, a hospital that is not matched up to capacity in some max-size
popular matching is not necessarily matched to the same set of residents in every max-size
popular matching.
Consider the instance G = (R ∪H,E) with R = {r, r′} and H = {h, h′} and cap(h) = 1 and
cap(h′) = 2. The edge set is R×H . The preferences are shown in the table below. The (max-size)
popular matchings are M = {(r, h), (r′, h′)} (in black) and M ′ = {(r, h′), (r′, h)} (in red). So h′
is matched to a different resident in the two max-size popular matchings M and M ′. Note that
M ′ is not stable, as (r, h) is a blocking pair.
3 M0 is a maximal element of a relation % if for all elements M1 we have: M1 % M0 implies M0 ∼M1.
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r : h, h′ h : r, r′
r′ : h, h′ h′ : r, r′
r
r′
h
h′
However Lemma 3 holds here. Such a result for max-size popular matchings in the one-to-one
setting (that every max-size popular matching has to match the same set of vertices) was shown
in [14]. Our proof is based on linear programming and is different from the combinatorial proof
in [14].
Lemma 3. Let T be a max-size popular matching in G. Then T matches the same vertices as
M0 (the matching computed in Section 2) and moreover, every vertex u is matched in T to the
same capacity as it gets matched to in M0.
Proof. Consider the realization T ∗ of T such that T ∗ is an (A′ ∪B′)-complete matching in G′M0
and wtM0(T
∗) = −∆(M0, T ). Since T is popular, we know that T ∗ has to include all the edges
(uk, ℓ(uk)) for vertices uk left unmatched in M
′
0 (by Lemma 1). Let T
′ = T ∗ \ {(uk, ℓ(uk)) : uk ∈
A′ ∪ B′}. Every vertex in G′M0 that is unmatched in M
′
0 is left unmatched in T
′ also. We also
have |M ′0| = |M0| = |T | = |T
′| as both M0 and T are max-size popular matchings in G. Hence
T ′ and M ′0 match the same vertices in G
′
M0
, i.e., every vertex v in G is matched in T to the same
capacity as it gets matched to in M0. ⊓⊔
We also show the following results here: Lemma 4 bounds the size ofM0, whereM0 is a max-
size popular matching in G and Lemma 5 shows that a pairwise-stable matching is a min-size
popular matching in G. The proofs of Lemmas 4 and 5 are inspired by analogous proofs in the
one-to-one setting shown in [20] and in [16], respectively.
Lemma 4. |M0| ≥
2
3 |Mmax|, where Mmax is a max-size matching in G.
Proof. The size of the matching M0 is exactly the same as M
′
0. Consider the graph G
′
M0
without
last resort neighbors (call this graph G′′M0) – we will show that every augmenting path with
respect to M ′0 here has length at least 5. This will immediately imply that |M
′
0| ≥ 2c/3 where c
is the size of the max-size matching in G′′M0 . The value c ≥ |Mmax| since corresponding to any
matching T in G, we have a matching T ′ in G′′M0 such that |T | = |T
′|. Thus the size of a max-size
matching in G′′M0 is at least |Mmax| and so we get |M0| ≥ 2|Mmax|/3.
ai
a′k
a′′t
b′s
b′′r
bj
R H ′
Fig. 2. An augmenting path with respect to M ′0 in the graph G
′′
M0
: the vertices ai, a
′
k have to belong to
A′1 while the vertices bj , b
′′
r have to belong to H
′
0. Thus the length is of this path is ≥ 5.
Consider any augmenting path p with respect to M ′0 in the graph G
′′
M0
(see Fig. 2) – let
the endpoints of p be ai and bj. Since these vertices are left unmatched in M
′
0, it follows that
ai ∈ A′1 and bj ∈ B
′
0. As seen in the proof of Lemma 1, the vertex ai is adjacent only to vertices
in B′1 in the graph G
′′
M0
and the unmatched vertex bj is adjacent only to vertices in A
′
0 in the
graph G′′M0 . Every vertex in A
′
0 is matched in M0 to a neighbor in B
′
0 and every vertex in B
′
1 is
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matched in M0 to a neighbor in A
′
1. Thus the shortest augmenting path with respect to M
′
0 has
the following structure with respect to the sets in {A′0, A
′
1, B
′
0, B
′
1} that its vertices belong to:
A′1-B
′
1-A
′
1-B
′
0-A
′
0-B
′
0, i.e., its length is at least 5. ⊓⊔
Lemma 5. A pairwise-stable matching S is a min-size weakly popular matching in G.
Proof. Let T be a matching in G such that |T | < |S|. Consider a realization T ∗ of the matching
T in the graph G′S as described in the proof of Theorem 1 such that T
∗ is (A′ ∪ B′)-complete
and wtS(T
∗) = −∆(S, T ). Recall that S is a pairwise-stable matching in G – hence for each edge
e in G′S , we have wtS(e) ≤ 0. Moreover, because |T | < |S|, there is a vertex ui that is matched
to a genuine neighbor in S, however T ∗ contains the edge e = (ui, ℓ(ui)). We have wtS(e) = −1.
Thus wtS(T
∗) < 0. In other words, ∆(S, T ) > 0 and T cannot be weakly popular. Since S is
a popular matching in G, it means that S is a min-size popular matching in G, in fact, S is a
min-size weakly popular matching in G. ⊓⊔
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Appendix
A A naive approach for finding max-size popular matchings
Given a many-to-many matching instance G = (A ∪ B,E), we investigate the possibility of
constructing a corresponding one-to-one matching instance G′ = (A′ ∪ B′, E′) (with strict pref-
erence lists) in order to show a reduction from the max-size popular matching problem in G
to one in G′. The vertex set A′ will have cap(a) many copies a1, a2, . . . of every a ∈ A and B′
will have cap(b) many copies b1, b2, . . . of every b ∈ B; the edge set E′ has cap(a) · cap(b) many
copies of edge (a, b) in E. If v ≻u v′ in G then we have vi ≻uk v
′
j for each i ∈ {1, . . . , cap(v)},
j ∈ {1, . . . , cap(v′)}, and k ∈ {1, . . . , cap(u)}. Among the copies v1, . . . , vcap(v) of the same vertex
v, we will set v1 ≻uk · · · ≻uk vcap(v), for each vertex uk in G
′.
Given any matching M˜ in G′, we define proj(M˜) as the projection of M˜ , which is the matching
obtained by dropping the subscripts of all vertices; proj(M˜) obeys all capacity bounds in G. We
will now consider the many-to-one or the hospitals/residents setting: so there are no multi-edges
in proj(M˜). It would be interesting to be able to show that every popular matching M in G has
a realization M˜ in G′ (i.e., proj(M˜) =M) such that M˜ is a popular matching in G′.
However the above statement is not true as shown by the following example. Let G = (R ∪
H,E) where R = {p, q, r, s} and H = {h, h′, h′′} where cap(h) = 2 and cap(u) = 1 for all other
vertices u. The preference lists are as follows:
p : h, h′′ h : p, q, r, s
q : h, h′ h′ : q
r : h h′′ : p
s : h
Consider the matching N = {(p, h), (q, h′), (r, h)}. We show below that N satisfies the suf-
ficient condition for popularity as given in Theorem 1. The proof of Claim 2 follows the same
approach as used in the proof of Theorem 2.
Claim 2 N is popular in G.
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Proof. We have R′ = {p1, q1, r1, s1} and H ′ = {h1, h2, h′1, h
′′
1}. Here we use the notation intro-
duced at the beginning of Section 3: let N ′ = {(p1, h1), (q1, h′1), (r1, h2)} (see Fig. 3).
r1
q1
h2
h′1
s1
p1 h1
h′′1
Fig. 3. The edges of the matching N ′ are in red and the non-matching edges in G′N are dashed. For
simplicity, we have not included last resort neighbors here. Note that the edge (q1, h2) is a blocking edge
to N ′ as both q1 and h2 prefer each other to their respective partners in N
′, i.e., wtN (q1, h2) = 2 and
wtN (e) = 0 for all other edges e in G
′
N .
We need to show that every (R′ ∪ H ′)-complete matching in the weighted graph G′N has
weight at most 0. We will show this by constructing a witness or a solution to the dual LP
corresponding to the primal LP which is the (R′ ∪H ′)-complete max-weight matching problem
in G′N . This solution is the following: αp1 = αh1 = αs1 = αh′′1 = 0 while αq1 = αh2 = 1 and
αr1 = αh′1 = −1. The above solution is dual-feasible since every edge in G
′
N is covered by the
sum of α-values of its endpoints – in particular, note that αq1 +αh2 = 2 = wtN (q1, h2). The dual
optimal solution is at most
∑
u∈R′∪H′ αu = 0. So the primal optimal solution is also at most 0,
in other words, N is a popular matching in G. ⊓⊔
Note that the graphG′ has two extra edges relative to G′N : these are (p1, h2) and (r1, h1). With
respect to realizations ofN inG′, there are 2 candidates: these areN1 = {(p1, h1), (q1, h′1), (r1, h2)}
and N2 = {(p1, h2), (q1, h
′
1), (r1, h1)}.
Claim 3 Neither N1 nor N2 is popular in G
′.
Proof. Consider the matchingM1 = {(p1, h′′1), (q1, h2), (r1, h1)}. The vertices p1, h1, and h
′
1 prefer
N1 to M1 while the vertices q1, h2, r1, and h
′′
1 prefer M1 to N1 and s1 is indifferent. Thus M1 is
more popular than N1, i.e., N1 is not a popular matching in G
′.
Consider the matching M2 = {(p1, h1), (q1, h′1), (s1, h2)}. The vertices r1 and h2 prefer N2 to
M2 while the vertices p1, h1, and s1 prefer M2 to N2 and q1, h
′
1, and h
′′
1 are indifferent. Thus
M2 is more popular than N2, i.e., N2 is not a popular matching in G
′. ⊓⊔
Note that the above instance can easily be transformed to another instance G with a max-
size popular matching that cannot be realized as a popular matching in G′. In fact, it is easy to
show that every popular matching in G′ gets projected to a popular matching in G. However as
illustrated by the example above, there may exist popular matchings in G that cannot be realized
as popular matchings in G′.
B Running time of our algorithm
It is known that the Gale-Shapley algorithm for the hospitals/residents problem (and thus in
the many-to-many setting) can be implemented to run in linear time [24]. Our algorithm is very
similar to the Gale-Shapley algorithm in the many-to-many setting. For the sake of completeness,
we describe a simple linear time implementation of our algorithm.
Recall that our algorithm runs in the graph H whose vertex set is A′′ ∪ B. For each vertex
u ∈ A′′ ∪B, right at the beginning of the algorithm, we will construct an array Du that contains
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all neighbors of u in decreasing order of preference. More precisely, Du is an array of length
degH(u) where Du[i] contains the identity of the i-th ranked neighbor of u. For a ∈ A
′′ and
1 ≤ i ≤ degH(a), the cell Da[i] also stores the value rankb(a), where b is a’s i-th ranked neighbor
in H and rankb(a) is the rank of a in b’s preference order in H .
It is easy to see that all the arrays Du can be constructed in O(m+ n) time, where m = |E|
and n = |A|+ |B|. We will maintain the function MaxRank(·) defined below for each b ∈ B:
MaxRank(b) =
{
rank of b’s worst neighbor in M if b is fully matched in M
∞ otherwise.
For any a ∈ A′′, before a proposes to a neighbor b, the vertex a first checks if rankb(a) <
MaxRank(b) and goes ahead with the proposal only if this condition is satisfied. If this condition
is not satisfied, i.e., if b ranks a worse than MaxRank(b), then the edge (a, b) is actually missing
in the current graph H and so a does not propose to b.
For any b ∈ B, when b receives a’s proposal (we assume that a’s proposal also contains the
value j = rankb(a)), b accepts this proposal by setting a flag in the cell Db[j] to true. Thus for
each b ∈ B and 1 ≤ j ≤ degH(b), along with the identity a of b’s j-th ranked neighbor in H , the
cell Db[j] also contains a flag set to true if (a, b) ∈M , else the flag is set to false. Thus the entire
matching M is stored via these flags in the arrays Db for b ∈ B.
If |M(b)| > cap(b) after b accepts a’s proposal, then we set the flag in the cell Db[MaxRank(b)]
to false. Also, MaxRank(b) needs to be updated and this is done by using a pointer to traverse
the array Db leftward from its current location to find the rightmost cell whose flag is set to true.
Consider the step where we check if b is already matched to u0 when u1 proposes to b. This
check can be easily performed by comparing u0’s rank in b’s preference order with MaxRank(b).
Note that u0’s rank in b’s preference order is rankb(u
1) + degG(b). If (u
0, b) ∈ M , then we need
to replace (u0, b) in M with (u1, b) – this step is implemented by setting the flag in Db[rankb(u
0)]
to false and the flag in Db[rankb(u
1)] to true, so this takes unit time. It is easy to see that our
entire algorithm can be implemented to run in linear time.
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